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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a quantification process for the risk 
module of the NSA RAdAC model.  The intent is to quantify the risk involved in a single 
information transaction.  Additionally, this thesis will attempt to identify the risk factors 
involved when calculating the total security risk measurement.  This list is not intended to 
be an all-inclusive list of every factor associated with a transaction.  Rather, we intend to 
supply a pragmatic list that is easily scalable to specific situations to include those factors 
which have the greatest effect on the total security risk measurement. In addition, we 
have asked experts in multiple fields to provide us with their opinion on the weighting of 
the risk factors.  Finally, these weight sets and concomitant risk factors will be tested for 
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Risk Adaptable Access Control (RAdAC) as formulated by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) is the concept for the next generation access control method based on a 
predetermined set of conventional and digital policies (McGraw, 2006).  Digital policies 
are defined such that they can be understood and evaluated by computers, vice 
conventional policies that are in the form of paper documents (Choudhary, 2005).  In 
tomorrow’s war-fighting environment, a commander must be allowed the leeway to make 
exceptions to rules when the operational need for information outweighs the risk of 
sharing it and do it having all of the information required to make a sound decision.  The 
implementation of the RAdAC engine will significantly enhance a commander’s overall 
situational awareness by automatically and instantaneously measuring the total security 
risk and operational need of the information transaction and then weighing those 
measurements against the conventional and digital policies previously established. 
The current method for sharing information is based on a combination of both 
MAC and DAC (McGraw, 2006).  An individual’s clearance level must match or exceed 
the classification level of the information requested.  In addition, the other stipulation 
inherent to accessing any information is the individual’s “need to know.”  The 
combination of these methods of sharing information lack the flexibility required to 
support the objectives for the information superiority vision of the GIG (Net-Centric 
Operational Environment Joint Integrating Concept, 2005). 
In the future, a “need to share” philosophy will allow information access to those 
who need it, when they need it.  The recent 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina disasters have 
demonstrated the obligation to prevent the stove-piping of information.  As technology 
rapidly evolves, the mandate to be able to securely share information rapidly and 
dynamically is paramount.  RAdAC is the access control method that will account for the 
total security risk and operational need of an information transaction and will allow that 
“need to share” philosophy to succeed. 
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B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a quantification process for the risk 
module of the NSA RAdAC model.  The intent is to quantify risk involved in a single 
information transaction.  The first step in this thesis will identify the risk factors involved 
when calculating the total security risk measurement.  Using the NSA identified risk 
categories we will create a list of possible factors that can be used in a RAdAC engine.  
This list is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of every factor associated with a 
transaction.  An in-depth analysis of individual transactions is not only impractical from a 
time standpoint, but it would also be extremely complex and cumbersome.  Rather, we 
intend to supply a pragmatic list that is easily scalable to specific situations to include 
those factors which have the greatest effect on the total security risk measurement. 
Next we will create a quantification process to calculate a Total Security Risk 
Measurement.  The process will assign a value to each of the individual factors and then 
be run through a model to create the final risk value.  A weighting scheme for the risk 
factors will be developed to be used in the model and finally, this list and concomitant 
risk factors will be tested for accuracy and practicality through the use of boundary case 
scenarios. 
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The first chapter will cover the scope of our thesis to include a description of 
items that we will include in the thesis as well as a list of assumptions.  Next, the problem 
proposal and methodology will be briefly explained and will contain a description of our 
implementation and testing methods.  The final subsection of Chapter I will examine the 
expected benefits of our research. 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will identify a set of risk factors associated with an information 
transaction in the NSA RAdAC model.  We will not attempt to identify the 
interdependency of the factors or find any correlating factors.  The second component to 
this thesis will be the identification of a process to quantitatively measure risk including a 
measure of uncertainty.  The focus will be on the security risk measurement in the Policy 
Decision Point and will not cover any portion of the operational need measurement or the 
policies that calculate the final policy decision. 
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E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The transaction initiator (human or machine) is who he says he is.  The 
authentication problem will not be accounted for in this thesis.  This includes all 
components of the system used for initiation and transmission of the transaction. 
There are no hardware/software failures. We will not account for uncertainty 
associated with human or machine error.  In addition, all components work as they are 
intended to work. 
The information is available and accurate.  This model does not account for risk 
involved with information integrity or availability.  This process will also not address the 
issue of the information being compromised during transmission. 
The factors identified are independent for the purposes of the risk measurement 
process.  We do not account for any interdependencies. 
F. PROBLEM PROPOSAL AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on developing a general transactional risk model that can be 
integrated into the RAdAC Policy Decision Point.  We will first identify a set of risk 
factors that correspond to the RAdAC risk categories.  The risk categories include factors 
that relate to the individuals involved, data requested, IT components, situational factors, 
environmental factors, and heuristics surrounding the transaction.  Without historical data 
to determine an actual statistical distribution, we will use Excel to create a triangle 
distribution to calculate the risk of each factor.  The triangle distribution calculates the 
amount of risk using a minimum, maximum and most likely value assigned by the user 
(Mun, 2004).  We will then use Monte Carlo simulation to add uncertainty to the risk 
factor measurement.  The model will then calculate a total security risk based on the most 
likely inputs from the triangle distribution multiplied by a set of weighting factors.  The 
weighting factors will be derived from interviewing experts in the fields of business, 
computer science, physical security and information assurance.  Finally we will test the 
model for accuracy using several boundary case scenarios. 
G. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will identify many of the risk factors associated with RAdAC.  It will 
also identify a process to quantify the risk factors that can be used to build a Digital Risk 
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Policy.  Other benefits of the research will be included in a section on paths taken that 





A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
There already are many DoD requirements that will depend on RAdAC to 
function properly.  This chapter will briefly discuss those documents that have stated a 
requirement for a working RAdAC engine including the Global Information Grid (GIG), 
NetOps, and the Net-Centric Operational Environment (NCOE).  In addition, this chapter 
will include background on the current access control methods of Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) and an overview of Multilevel Security (MLS).  Finally, Chapter II will provide 
an in-depth look at the NSA RAdAC model.  It will cover the policy architecture 
followed by a description of the individual modules that comprise the whole, as well as a 
discussion of the policies themselves and the management of the conventional and digital 
policies that drive the concept. 
B. DOD TRANSFORMATION GUIDANCE 
1. Global Information Grid 
As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the 
kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges 
and to unexpected circumstances.  We must transform not only the 
capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, 
the way we exercise and the way we fight.  We must transform not only 
our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by 
encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking. 
Donald Rumsfeld (Transformation Planning Guidance, 2003) 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Transformation Planning Guidance (2003) 
defines the desired outcome of transformation as “fundamentally joint, network-centric, 
distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the 
battle space.”  The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2006) defines Net-centricity as 
The realization of a robust, globally networked environment within which 
data is shared seamlessly and in a timely manner among users, 
applications, and platforms.  By securely interconnecting people and 
systems, independent of time or location, net-centricity enables 
substantially improved military situational awareness and significantly 
shortened decision making cycles.  Users are empowered to better protect 
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assets; more effectively exploit information; more efficiently use 
resources; and unify our forces by supporting extended, collaborative 
communities to focus on the mission. 
The DoD’s approach for transforming to net-centric operations and warfare uses 
the GIG as “the organizing and transforming construct for managing information 
technology throughout the Department” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006).  The 
GIG and its assets are defined in DoD Directive 8100.1 (2002) as follows 
The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, 
associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, 
policy makers, and support personnel.  The GIG includes all owned and 
leased communications and computing systems and services, software 
(including applications), data security services, and other associated 
services necessary to achieve Information Superiority.  The GIG supports 
all DoD, National Security, and related Intelligence Community missions 
and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, and business) in war and in 
peace.  The GIG provides capabilities from all operating locations (bases, 
posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed sites) and 
provides interfaces to coalition, allied and non-DoD users and systems. 
The vision of the GIG is to empower users through easy access to information 
anytime, anyplace, under any conditions with attendant security to achieve Information 
Superiority as shown in Figure 1. 
7 
 
Figure 1.   GIG Vision (From: McGraw, 2004) 
 
2. NetOps 
Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is assigned the 
responsibility to operate and defend the GIG.  NetOps is the operational tool that 
CDRUSSTRATCOM will use to achieve that mission.  NetOps, as stated in the Joint 
Concept of Operations for Global Information Grid NetOps (2005), consists of three 
primary functions: Essential tasks, Command and Control (C2), and Situational 
Awareness (SA).  Each of the definitions from the NetOps document is provided below. 
a. Essential Tasks 
NetOps uses an integrated approach to accomplish the three 
interdependent essential tasks necessary to operate and defend the GIG.  These tasks are 
GIG Enterprise Management (GEM), GIG Network Defense (GND) and Information 
Dissemination Management / Content Staging (IDM/CS).  NetOps is not simply GEM 
8 
and GND and IDM/CS tacked together. Rather, it is the methodical integration of 
individual capabilities and the resultant synergy. 
b. Command and Control 
NetOps C2 will provide a seamless C2 environment that is dynamic, 
decentralized, distributed, and enabled by robust, secure and integrated networks.  
NetOps C2 will be able to create desired GIG effects at the right time and place to 
accomplish the mission. 
c. Situational Awareness 
NetOps will provide a shared SA to improve the quality and timeliness of 
collaborative decision-making regarding the employment, protection and defense of the 
GIG.  Much of this GIG SA will be available and shared in near real-time by the relevant 
decision-makers. 
3. Net-Centric Operational Environment 
The Net-Centric Operational Environment (NCOE) is an operational subset of the 
GIG (Net-Centric Operational Environment Joint Integrating Concept, 2005). The NCOE 
uses the NetOps framework but also expands it by incorporating knowledge management 
(KM), network management (NM), and information assurance (IA).  The NCOE is 
supported by its Enabling Constructs which includes a comprehensive matrix of 
Capabilities, Tasks and Standards.  Section 7.11 of this matrix lists RAdAC as a technical 
capability needed for the NCOE to achieve the ability to identify, store, share, and 
exchange data and information. 
C. CURRENT ACCESS CONTROL METHODS 
Access controls are security features that control how users and systems 
communicate and interact with other systems and resources (Harris, 2003).  They are 
used to permit or deny the use of an object, such as a system or file, by a subject such as 
an individual or process.  Access control mechanisms are a necessary and crucial design 
element of any application’s security.  Ideally, an access control mechanism should 
protect against the unauthorized viewing, modification, or copying of data.  Additionally, 
access control mechanisms should limit malicious code execution and unauthorized 
actions through an attacker exploiting infrastructure dependencies. 
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Access control systems provide the essential services of identification, 
authentication, authorization, and accountability.  Identification and authentication (I&A) 
determine who can log on to a system.  Authorization determines what an authenticated 
user can do and accountability identifies what a user did (CNSS Instruction No. 4009 
National Information Assurance Glossary, 2006).  There are several access control 
systems in the information security realm.  A successful access control protection system 
will likely combine aspects of each of the following mechanisms. 
1. Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory access control (MAC) is an access control policy determined by the 
system, not the data owner.  Access decisions are made beyond the control of the 
individual owner of an object (Pfleeger, 2003).  The most important feature of MAC 
involves denying users full control over the access to resources that they create.  The 
system security policy entirely determines the access rights granted.  A user may not 
grant less restrictive access to their resources than the administrator specifies. 
MAC must be non-bypassable, evaluatable, always-invoked and tamper-proof.  
Controlling the import of information to and export from a system is a critical function of 
MAC so that sensitive information is appropriately protected at all times. 
MAC prevents an authenticated user or process at a specific classification or trust-
level from accessing information, processes, or devices at a different level.  This provides 
a mechanism for the containment of users and processes, both known and unknown.  In a 
MAC-based system, all subjects and objects must have security labels assigned to them.  
A user’s security label, the user’s clearance, specifies their level of trust.  An object’s 
security label, its classification, specifies the level of trust required for access.  In order to 
read a given object, the subject must have a security label equal to or higher than the 
requested object. In order to write to the object, the subject must have the same 
classification as the object. MAC mechanisms ensure that all users only have access to 
that data for which they have clearance and do not write data to objects at lower levels. 
2. Discretionary Access Control 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a means of restricting access to data based 
on the identity and need-to-know of users.  The controls are discretionary in the sense 
that the data’s owner determines who should have access rights to the object and what 
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those rights should be (Pfleeger, 2003).  The need to know principle is similar to the least 
privilege principle.  It is based on the concept that individuals should only be given 
access to the information that they absolutely require in order to perform their job duties 
(Harris, 2003).  Normally, the owner of a resource is the person who created the resource.  
Data owners can determine the level of access given to other users (read, write, copy, 
etc.) and can transfer ownership of information to other users.  A potential security 
vulnerability of DAC is the ability of data owners, through accident or malice, to give 
access to unauthorized users. 
Access decisions are granted to a user based on the credentials that were 
presented at the time of authentication.  Users who do not have permissions to access the 
information should also not be able to determine its characteristics such as file size, file 
name, directory path, etc.  Users may belong to one or many groups and can acquire 
cumulative permissions.  They can also be disqualified from any permission that isn’t 
part of every group to which they belong. 
3. Role-Based Access Control 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an approach to restricting system access to 
authorized users based on an individual’s role within an organization (Curphey, 2002).  
RBAC is an alternative approach to MAC and DAC in that it assigns permissions to 
specific operations with meaning in an organization.  RBAC access control systems 
provide the ability to determine who can perform what actions, when, from where and in 
what order.  Within an organization, roles are created for various job functions and 
centrally managed by security administrators.  Permissions are then assigned to the 
specific roles based on the principle of least privilege.  Users acquire the permissions to 
perform particular system functions through their role assignments.  Since users are not 
assigned permissions directly, but only acquire them through their roles, management of 
individual user rights becomes a matter of assigning the appropriate role or multiple 
simultaneous roles to the user.  As complexity of commands or files increases the 
management and organization of roles becomes more crucial. 
4. Multilevel Security 
Multilevel Security (MLS) is the capability of a computer system to carry 
information with different classification levels, permit simultaneous access by users with 
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different security clearances and needs-to-know, and prevent users from obtaining access 
to information for which they lack authorization (Harris, 2003).  MLS systems allow 
access to less-sensitive information by higher-cleared individuals, and allow them to 
share sanitized documents with lower-cleared individuals.  MLS systems incorporate two 
essential features.  Based on the Bell-LaPadula model or a close variant thereof, the 
system must enforce access restrictions regardless of the actions of system users or 
administrators.  Second, MLS systems must enforce these restrictions with incredibly 
high reliability.  According to Dr. Rick Smith (2005), “Although Bell-LaPadula has 
accurately defined a MLS capability that keeps data safe, it has not led to the widespread 
development of successful multilevel systems.” MAC and MLS systems are often, but 
not always, tied together. 
D. RADAC OVERVIEW 
1. Basic Architecture 
The basic architecture of the NSA RAdAC model has been provided by Dr. 
Abdur Choudhary (2005) based on the IETF standard policy framework (Yavatkar, 
Pendarakis, Guerin, 2000).  The basic structure starts with an information requestor.  This 
may be a person, system or application.  The information transaction request is then 
routed through the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).  The PEP is responsible for the 
enforcement of the decision to grant access or deny information from the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP).  The PDP is the “brain” of the RAdAC engine.  It consists of the Security 
Risk Measurement, the Operational Need Measurement and returns the Final Access 
Decision.  Figure 2 shows the high level architecture for the NSA RAdAC model and 
Figure 3 shows the policy-based architecture. 
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Figure 2.   RAdAC High Level Architecture (From: Choudhary, 2005) 
 
2. Policy Management 
The dynamic management of the policies is the other lynchpin to making RAdAC 
successful.  The conventional and digital policies must be continually updated for any 
given situation and commander’s intent.  The digital policies, used by both the Security 
Risk Function and the Operational Need Function, may consist of simple if/then 
statements.  The PBM infrastructure must manage the conventional policies with a 
minimal set of functions that consist of policy definition, translation, validation, 
distribution, activation, execution, and audit (Choudhary, 2005). 
3. Information Transaction 
Rather than clearing an individual access to a certain level of information for what 
amounts to lifetime trust, RAdAC requires a more granular approach (Horizontal 
Integration, 2004).  Each transaction will be identified, calculated and then reviewed to 
give the appropriate access.  Transaction, in this context, means a single request of 
classified information (hard or soft copies) for a given amount of time.  Examples of an 
information transaction could include a single classified briefing multicast to involved 
parties or a hard copy classified document such as an Air Tasking Order given to a pilot 
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or any number of scenarios like these.  Allowing a requestor access to multiple 
information items or levels of information would not allow the RAdAC engine to 
evaluate the risk or operational need at the appropriate scale. 
4. Requestor 
The information requestor can be an individual, system or application.  The 
traditional definition for information requestor involves a person with a need for 
information.  RAdAC will stretch the definition to incorporate requestor as machine or 
application.  For example, a weapons system may request positional and weather data for 
a targeting sequence that may be completely invisible to the trigger puller.  In this 
instance, RAdAC would measure the risk and operational need of a machine to machine 
transaction. 
5. Policy-Based Management 
Policy-based management (PBM) is typically used as a way to allocate network 
resources, primarily network bandwidth, Quality of Service and security, according to 
pre-defined policies.  In the context of RAdAC, PBM can be used to provide real time, 
dynamic answers about whom and what can access which resources on the network.  
PBM allows administrators to define rules and manage them in the policy system.  These 
rules take the form “If condition, then action” (Sheldon, 2001).  The Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) Policy Framework Working Group has developed a policy-based 
management architecture that includes the following components; Policy management 
service, dedicated policy repository, policy enforcement point, policy decision point, and 
local policy decision point (Yavatkar, Pendarakis, Guerin, 2000).  RAdAC incorporates 




Figure 3.   RAdAC PDP Policy Based Architecture (From: Choudhary, 2005) 
 
The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is the point on a server that enforces policy 
decisions in response to a request from a user requesting access to a resource on a 
computer or network server (Yavatkar, Pendarakis, Guerin, 2000).  The Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) is the point on a server that makes policy decisions in response to a request 
from a user wanting to access a resource on a computer or network server (Yavatkar, 
Pendarakis, Guerin, 2000).  The PEP initiates communication between the two 
components.  When the PEP receives a request that requires a policy decision it will 
formulate a policy decision request and send it to the PDP.  The PDP returns the policy 
decision and the PEP is then responsible for enforcing it by either denying or accepting 
the original request.  Common Open Policy Service (COPS) is the most common protocol 
used to communicate policy information between the PEP and PDP.  COPS is a 
client/server protocol that provides transport services for moving policy information 
among IP network nodes (Sheldon, 2001). 
The key to an effective PBM system is an effective policy (McGraw, 2006).  A 
policy is a rule set governing an entity behavior.  The rule set must be centrally defined 
and follow a common information model.  A policy also has the following attributes: A 
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scope, mechanism, an action, and a triggering event or condition (Martin, 1999).  
Historically, businesses have had conventional policies that were on paper and were 
simply the rules by which a company operates. 
In order for PBM to work these policies must be automated and converted into 
digital polices.  Digital policies are comprised of policy objects and policy elements that 
are able to be accessed by network components in real time.  A policy object contains 
policy-related information such as policy elements and is carried in a request or response 
related to a resource access decision.  A policy element contains single units of 
information necessary for the evaluation of policy rules.  One policy element may carry 
user identification whereas another policy element may carry user credentials.  The 
policy elements themselves are expected to be independent (Martin, 1999). 
A PBM system will have many policies that work together to create a system that 
is capable of making complex decisions. The digital policies are organized into 
repositories, known as the policy information bases (PIB).  The policies are retrieved via 
various servers such as those for the access control policy, authentication, authorization, 
and access rights.  Policy retrieval uses standard interfaces such as the lightweight 
directory access protocol (LDAP) (Choudhary, 2005). 
Figure 4 shows an example of the decision making process that occurs during a 




Figure 4.   RAdAC Notional Process Model (From: McGraw, 2006) 
 
6. RAdAC Policy Architecture 
a. Security Risk Measurement Function 
RAdAC incorporates a real time, probabilistic determination of security 
risk into the access control decision rather than just using a hard comparison of the 
attributes of the subject and object as in traditional models (McGraw, 2006).  The 
security risk measurement function provides a quantitative assessment of the amount of 
risk associated with granting a requester access to a resource.  Risk is introduced into 
each request from a variety of sources.  The value of the information being accessed in 
conjunction with the trustworthiness of the requester, the protection level of the IT 
components, the current operational situation and the threat level of that environment 
along with the access history of each of these factors all contribute to the total security 
risk.  Many types of digital policies will be needed to assist this function in determining a 
total security measurement (Choudhary, 2005).  Digital policies will determine some 
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quantitative level of risk associated with each of these factors as well as a quantitative 
level of total risk.  These policies will also specify the acceptable level of risk for each 
risk factor and the total amount of acceptable risk. 
b. Operational Need Determination Function 
The function that determines operational need provides a quantifiable 
measure of the operational need associated with an access control decision.  Historically, 
operational need was called “need to know” and was used as a way to restrict access 
instead of grant access.  The RAdAC operational need determination function allows 
operational need to enable access if, under specified conditions, the operational need 
outweighs the security risk. 
At this point in an information transaction the security risk has been 
determined.  Digital policies would specify the requirements for determining the level of 
operational need, depending on whether the security risk was acceptable or unacceptable.  
Even if the security risks were acceptable there may be situations in which the requester 
has no operational need to access the information. 
There may also be situations that the security risk was determined to be 
unacceptable but the requestor might have an operational need to access the information 
regardless of that risk.  The digital policies used must be able to specify whether 
operational need may outweigh security risk, which areas of security risk operational 
need may take precedence over, and under what conditions (McGraw, 2005).  
Operational need digital policies must be able to describe the criteria and environment to 
assess how important the access decision is to the satisfactory performance of the system 
or mission operations.  Factors such as the requestor’s location, rank, mission or other 
situational factors might be used to determine a level of operational need that can 
outweigh the risk involved.  In addition, these policies must also make use of all the 
information described in the security risk measurement (Choudhary, 2005). 
c. Final Access Decision Function 
The final access decision function makes the final determination on 
whether to grant access or not.  It will take input from both the security risk measurement 
function and the operational need determination function.  The digital policies used here 
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will specify the acceptable levels of risk of individual components of the RAdAC process 
and the level of operational need required to outweigh those security risks. 
Final access decision digital policies will specify the rules for access for 
various classes of information objects under different conditions (McGraw, 2006). The 
final access decision function uses a dynamic weighting system that incorporates real 
time environmental factors, situational factors, heuristics, and digital policies into every 
decision (Choudhary, 2005).  The digital policies specify the relative weighting of these 
risk factors in computing a composite risk.  A critical element to making the RAdAC 
model successful is effectively implementing and managing digital policies (McGraw, 
2006).  Figure 5 is a functional depiction of the factors that go into the final access 




Figure 5.   RAdAC Functional Depiction (From: McGraw, 2006) 
19 
III. RADAC RISK FACTORS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will provide an in-depth look at the NSA RAdAC risk factors.  The 
NSA has identified six main risk categories: characteristics of the requester, 
characteristics of the IT components, situational factors, environmental factors, 
characteristics of the information requested and heuristics (McGraw, 2006).  Each of 
these categories has a number of sub-factors that can be associated with them.  This thesis 
has attempted to identify the most significant risk sub-factors that will have the greatest 
impact on each of the main categories. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF REQUESTER 
Characteristics of the requester are the risks associated with the person, machine 
or application that is requesting access to the data.  The Jason Report identified several 
factors that should be examined that relate to the individual involved in the transaction 
(Horizontal Integration, 2004).  This thesis addresses some of those factors and identifies 
several more.  This risk category will consist of factors such as the person’s role, rank, 
clearance level and education level.  The purpose of this risk category is to assess how 
trustworthy the requester is.  The higher the level of trust, the lower this risk value will 
be. 
1. Role 
This risk factor is associated with the requester’s role within an organization.  
Typically, in the military, this would correspond to the requester’s position of authority in 
that organization.  Examples of this within the United States Navy include a 
Commanding Officer, an Executive Officer, a Department Head, a Division Officer and 
then service members. 
In the scenario tested by this thesis, the assumption has been made that the higher 
a requester’s role is within an organization the less likely they are to be a security risk.  
The opposite is true for the lower the requester’s role.  A new service member who has 
no position of authority will be more likely to commit a security violation whether 
through malice or negligence.  With actual data, the opposite may be found to be true 
with a lower risk value assigned to a requester with a lower role. 
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2. Rank 
Rank deals strictly with the risk associated the requester’s relative position within 
a structured organization.  Ranks in the military are divided between officers and 
enlisted.  Officer ranks start at O-1 and go to O-10 while enlisted ranks range from E-1 to 
E-9. 
Similar to the requester’s role, the assumption has been made for testing purposes 
that the likelihood of occurrence decreases as the requester’s rank increases, but again, 
actual statistics may prove this untrue. 
3. Clearance Level 
This risk factor is associated with the clearance level the requester holds.  The 
most common clearances in the military are Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and no 
clearance.  Unlike role and rank, where it is speculated that risk is inversely proportional 
as the role and rank increase, actual procedures, guidelines and policies are followed to 
ensure risk is adequately measured and minimized before allowing clearances to be 
issued.  The test values for this thesis follow the assumption that these risk mitigations 
have been used for higher clearance thresholds.  The higher the clearance granted, the 
lower the assigned risk value. 
4. Access Level 
This risk factor is associated with the access level of the requestor.  Typically 
access level is simply a “yes” or “no” question.  This is referred to more commonly as 
“need to know.”  If the requester has been granted access to information, the risk would 
be lower than if the requester has not been granted access.  However, risk could increase 
if the requester is granted access by a third party instead of the data owner. 
5. Previous Violations 
This risk factor takes account of any security violations the requester may have 
had in the past.  If a requester has had a violation in the past, this would increase the risk 
of the transaction.  If the requester has no record of previous violations, this would not 
necessarily lower the risk, but it would simply not add to it. 
6. Education Level 
This risk factor is associated with the amount of security related training or 
education the requester has received.  Typically, the more security related training a 
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requester has received the less likely that requester is to commit a security violation.  
Therefore, the security risk would be lower.  Conversely, if a requester has not received 
any security training there is a higher possibility that a security violation could occur due 
to negligent action or inaction. 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF IT COMPONENTS 
Characteristics of the IT Components have to do with the risk associated with 
every component in the information transaction path.  This risk category will consist of 
factors such as the type of machines being used, the distance the information has to 
travel, including the number of hops it must go through, applications involved, the 
encryption type and level being used.  The purpose of this risk category is to assess how 
safe the data will be in transit, the higher the level of protection, the lower the risk value. 
1. Machine Type 
This risk factor is associated with the type of machines involved in the 
information transaction.  There are many different types of machines that could be 
involved in the transaction.  The most common would be servers, desktops and portable 
digital assistants (PDA).  Servers would tend to be the most secure machine, while a PDA 
would introduce a higher amount of risk because of the vulnerabilities it would be 
exposed to, including loss or theft. 
2. Applications 
This risk factor is associated with the applications involved in the information 
transaction.  There are a large number of applications that exist, but they can be narrowed 
down to the most common ones that are used to access information.  They can then be 
narrowed down even further by those that have been approved for use in DoD systems.  
The most common applications used in an information transaction would be a database 
query, a file share or a browser.  Each of these applications would have different risk 
values associated with them. 
3. Connection Type 
This risk factor is associated with the physical connections that create the 
information path.  There are two broad categories, wired and wireless.  Both of these 
have several sub categories such as copper wire or fiber optic for wired transactions and 
802.11 or HF and UHF for wireless transactions. 
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The lowest risk has been assigned to a fiber optic connection for a number of 
reasons inherent in fiber optic cable (Denning, 1999).  The risk would increase as the 
connection introduces more points at which the information could be intercepted or if a 
less secure medium is introduced within the transaction path. 
4. Authentication Type 
This risk factor is linked to the type of authentication used by the requester to 
verify identity.  There are currently only a few accepted methods to verify identity.  The 
most secure way would use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and would have the lowest 
risk value.  The least secure would be a simple username and password and would have 
the highest risk value.  Other authentication methods include biometrics, tokens and 
certificates.  Each authentication method has different risks associated with it including 
biometric false positives, lost tokens and the distribution of certificates. 
5. Network 
This risk factor is associated with the network that the information transaction 
occurs.  Currently, the most widely used networks in DoD are the Internet, Unclassified 
but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNet) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
(JWICS).  Each network employs different protection mechanisms and has different 
numbers of people who have access to the network.  JWICS would be considered the 
most secure network because of the high level of protections in place and the low number 
of people who have access to the network.  The Internet would have the highest risk 
value because of the large number of people who have access to it and because it 
provides a very low number of protection devices. 
The future implementation of the GiG intends to bridge all of these networks into 
a single network; therefore, the risk value would be that of the least secure part the 
information transaction traverses.  In the future, routing algorithms may take security risk 
into account when computing routes for various kinds of information flow.  A route may 
be chosen purely on lowest risk rather than shortest path or least weight. 
6. Encryption Level 
This risk factor is associated with the level of encryption used to protect the 
information during transmission.  There are many widely accepted types of encryption in 
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use and each of the types has various levels normally set by the key length of the 
encryption.  Examples include Public Key Encryption (PKE), Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) and Data Encryption Standard (DES).  Each of these types of encryption 
provides different levels of protection and can also be implemented with key lengths 
ranging from 64 bits to 2024 bits.  Various government agencies including NSA, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) all provide guidance about what encryption should be used in which 
environment. 
7. Distance 
The distance risk factor is associated with the distance between the requester and 
the information.  Generally speaking, the further the information has to travel the more 
risk is introduced.  If the requester and the information are in the same building this 
would represent the least amount of risk.  If the requester and the information were in 
different countries, thousands of miles apart, this would have a much higher risk value.  
Physical distance is not the only factor either, the more hops the information has to travel 
through the higher the risk is with the transaction.  Under certain circumstances a shorter 
distances may have a higher risk than a longer distance if the number of hops is greater. 
D. SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
Situational factor risk is associated with the situation surrounding the transaction 
itself.  The Jason Report identified some factors included in this category (Horizontal 
Integration, 2004).  This thesis addresses some of those factors and identifies several 
more.  This risk category will consist of factors such as the mission role of the requester, 
the transaction type and the time sensitivity of the information.  The purpose of this risk 
category is to assess the amount of risk associated with the transaction without regard to 
the data or requester. 
1. Specific Mission Role 
This risk factor is associated with the mission the requester is currently engaged 
in.  The information that is being requested should directly relate to the mission of the 
requester.  If there is a direct relationship, this could lower the risk of the transaction.  A 
request for information that is not directly related to a mission would have a higher risk 
value. 
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2. Time Sensitivity of Situation 
This risk factor is associated with how quickly the requester needs to have access 
to the data in order to complete a mission.  In an urgent situation the requester may only 
have minutes to retrieve a piece of information and be able to act on it.  This urgent 
situation would lower the overall risk value.  If the requester is on a mission that does not 
have an urgent need to access the data the risk value would go up.  The assumption made 
for this thesis is that once the situation is over the use of the information will no longer be 
needed, therefore the shorter the timeline of the situation the lower the risk value. 
3. Transaction Type 
This risk factor is associated with how the data is being accessed and what the 
intended use of the data may be.  There are several methods of accessing data including 
queries, displays and copies.  A simple query or one time event to see if a piece of 
information exists would have a lower risk than requesting a copy of that information. 
4. Auditable or Non-auditable 
This risk factor is associated with the ability to record who, where, when and how 
the information was accessed.  An assumption is made that if the machines have the 
capability to log transactions they also have the capability to be remotely audited and the 
transaction data consolidated to a single database.  If the requester is using equipment 
that is able to log the history associated with the information transaction, this will lower 
the risk value of the transaction.  A request for information that comes from a piece of 
equipment that is not capable of logging would have a higher risk value. 
5. Audience Size 
This risk factor is associated with the expected number of individuals or machines 
that will see a copy of the requested data.  A request for information that comes from a 
system that is capable of distributing that information to a large audience would have a 
high risk value.  A request from a single user using a PDA would have a lower risk value 
because it is likely that user will be the only one to see that information. 
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Environmental factors are risks associated with the environment surrounding the 
transaction itself and the increased likelihood of an adversary being able to exploit that 
transaction (Choudhary, 2005).  This risk category will consist of factors such as the 
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current location of the requester and the data.  The purpose of this risk category is to 
assess the amount of risk associated with the transaction with regard to the environment. 
1. Current Location 
This risk factor is associated with the physical security of the current location of 
the requester.  The requester could be located anywhere in the world and could be in a 
variety of locations within a certain area.  The most common locations within the military 
are Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF), Secure Operation Centers, 
Operation Centers, Field Locations and open terminals.  A SCIF is an extremely secure 
environment with little chance of the requested information being compromised while an 
open terminal in an Internet Café would be a non-secure location with a high chance of 
compromise.  The regional location of the physical location also affects the risk value.  
For example, an Operation Center in Iraq will have a higher risk value than an Operation 
Center in the United States. 
2. Threat Level 
This risk factor is associated with the current threat level of the region of the 
world that the requester is located.  There are various warning systems in use including, 
in the DoD, DEFCON, INFOCON and FPCON; for the United States, The Homeland 
Security Advisory System; and for the world, WATCHCON and SANS INFOCON 
(Guild, 2004).  They all have threat levels ranging from Low to High.  As the threat level 
of a location increases so will the risk value of the information transaction.  Research is 
needed to evaluate each of the various warning systems and their applicability to 
RAdAC. 
F. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED 
Characteristics of the information requested is the risk associated with the 
information itself.  This risk category will consist of factors such as the classification 
level of the data, the permissions of the data and other aspects of the data that are 
required to gain access to it.  The purpose of this risk category is to assess how sensitive 





1. Classification Level 
This risk factor is associated with the classification level of the data.  The most 
common classification levels in the military are Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) and Unclassified.  There are other classification levels that 
fall within the above broader categories such as NATO Restricted, No Foreign, etc...  The 
higher the data is classified the higher the risk value will be to access it.  An information 
transaction that requests unclassified data would have a risk value near zero while a 
request for Top Secret information would be at the high end of the scale. 
2. Encryption Level Required to Access 
This risk factor is associated with the predetermined level of encryption that is 
required to access particular information.  Certain kinds of information, regardless of its 
classification level, may require specific levels of encryption in order to access it 
(Choudhary, 2005).  This factor is independent of the encryption that is actually being 
used.  For example, data on a DoD website may require SSL encryption to access it even 
though the data is unclassified.  The higher the encryption level required the higher the 
risk value for the transaction will be. 
3. Network Classification Level 
This risk factor is associated with network classification level required for the 
information to be transmitted.  Generally, the classification of the data would determine 
this requirement.  Data classified at the secret level would need to be transmitted on the 
SIPRNet or higher.  In order for the GiG to function, data must be able to cross domains 
when needed.  In this case, it is possible that secret data could transit across the NIPRNet 
or lower.  The risk value for the transaction will increase as the network classification 
required increases, because the chance of a transmission over a lower classified network 
could increase. 
4. Permission Level 
This risk factor is associated with the permissions set on the data.  The most 
common permissions are read only, writable or executable.  An information transaction 
could have numerous other permissions that apply.  Data might be tagged as only being 
able to be queried, displayed, or it might be able to be copied but not modified.  The 
higher the permissions on the data the lower the risk value will be. 
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5. Time Sensitivity 
This risk factor is associated with the time sensitivity of the data itself.  Data can 
be either perishable or non-perishable.  Data that is perishable can have varying degrees 
that are measured in time.  Data could have an expected life of just minutes to hours, days 
or weeks.  Data that is non-perishable is considered to be useful for a significant length of 
time, generally years or decades even.  The risk value will be highest for non-perishable 
data and will decrease as the expected useful lifetime of the data decreases. 
G. HEURISTICS 
This risk category is associated with the amount of risk in a transaction based on 
similar transactions that have occurred before.  This risk category will consist of a record 
of all transactions that have occurred and the risk value associated with them.  The 
purpose of this risk category is to either lower or raise the risk value based on the history 
of similar transactions.  The principles for this risk category is the concept of a Trust 
Management System that is able to learn the behavior of the components in a transaction 
and then predict what their future behavior will be (Adams & Davis, 2005). 
1. Risk Knowledge 
This risk factor is associated with any known previous security violations 
associated with the information transaction.  Each unsuccessful information transaction 
will be recorded and will raise the risk value if those components are used in future 
transactions.  Examples of this include a requester who is known to have misused data or 
an IT component that is known to have been compromised. 
2. Trust Level 
This risk factor is associated with a history of successful information transactions 
that have occurred.  Each successful information transaction will build trust with the 
components of that transaction.  The more successful transactions a requester, IT 
component, etc. has completed, the lower the risk value will be for future transactions 
involving those same components. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The NSA identified six main risk categories and this thesis identifies several risk 
factors for each category.  This list is not intended to be all inclusive but rather the list 
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represents those factors that we feel represent the most significant amounts of risk in an 




Table 1.   RAdAC Risk Factors 
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IV. QUANTIFICATION PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will introduce and explain the quantification process used in the 
calculation of the Total Security Risk Measurement.  It will start with the rationale for the 
simplified triangular distribution used to represent the data in the thesis.  Next, the 
chapter will discuss the different levels of risk and provide a definition for low, medium 
and high probability of occurrence and consequence of occurrence.  The chapter will also 
provide a discussion of a collection of expert’s weightings.  Finally, the chapter will 
present a brief explanation on Monte Carlo simulation and uncertainty, as well as an 
explanation of the Excel spread sheet and the calculations for individual risk factors and 
the Total Security Risk Measurement. 
B. DATA 
At this time there is no statistical data available for the risk factors to determine 
an actual distribution and form an accurate model.  In order to demonstrate the process of 
computing a Total Security Risk Measurement a simplified triangular distribution was 
used in lieu of actual data points.  In the future perhaps a real world statistical database 
will be available to the RAdAC engine via dynamic update, using XML data tagging 
(Choudhary, 2004). 
During a general transaction, we assume that an individual inserts his Common 
Access Card on which his User Identity (UI) is stored.  Every piece of information that is 
stored on his card including security clearance, secret keys, public keys, position in 
hierarchy, and user name is encoded and sent through the network.  The Context 
Specification (CS), which includes the owner of the mission, the mission that the user is 
engaged in and the task within the mission will be tagged and sent through the network in 
the same manner to complete the Compound Identity (CI) (Choudhary, 2006).  
Concurrently, each node in the network will have its own metadata tag to be encapsulated 
in the datagram and will have its own specific risk numeric.  The process continues 
through every identified risk factor to complete the risk measurement. 
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Figure 6.   A Schematic View for Defining a Compound Identity (From: Choudhary, 
2006) 
 
C. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
For the purpose of demonstrating the Total Security Risk Measurement process a 
simple triangular distribution was chosen.  A triangular distribution has three underlying 
conditions: a specific minimum, a specific maximum and most likely value that falls 
somewhere between the minimum and maximum.  The most likely value would occur 
more times than either the minimum or maximum thus forming a triangle (Mun, 2006). 
The triangle distribution has been chosen for this thesis because the risk ranges, 
low, medium and high, fit the minimum and maximum conditions.  When actual data 








D. DEFINITION OF RISK 
The IA Pub 5239.16 (2003) defines risk as “a combination of the likelihood that a 
threat will occur, the likelihood that a threat occurrence will result in an adverse impact, 
and the severity of the resulting impact.” 
1. Probability of Occurrence 
a. High 
The attack requires a minimal combination of effort and coincidence of 
events to succeed, and/or the threat-agent is both motivated and capable. 
b. Medium 
The attack requires moderate effort and coincidence of events to succeed.  
The threat-agent has some of the resources required and/or a moderate level of 
motivation. 
c. Low 
Countermeasures are in place to prevent or significantly impede successful 
exploitation, and/or the threat-agent lacks motivation or capability. 
2. Consequence of Occurrence 
The categories of the consequence of occurrence were given to the experts to 
provide a scale on which to base their opinion.  They are not used further in this thesis. 
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a. High 
Successful exploitation could result in substantial impact to the 
organization, including unavailability, modification, disclosure, or destruction of valued 
data or other system assets; loss of system services for an unacceptable period of time; or 
possible injury to or death of personnel. 
b. Medium 
Successful exploitation could result in moderate impact to the 
organization, such as discernable but recoverable unavailability, modification, disclosure, 
or destruction of data or other system assets or services. 
c. Low 
Unavailability, modification, disclosure, or destruction of data or 
degradation of system assets and services are easy to detect and correct, and impact to the 
organization is minor. 
E. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
Monte Carlo Simulation is a forecasting tool used to incorporate a level of 
uncertainty and randomness (Mun, 2006).  Like rolling the dice repeatedly to see what 
combinations will appear, Monte Carlo simulation will run a predefined probability 
distribution through a function a preset number of times to provide a forecast.  The initial 
input variable is randomly selected from the probability distribution and run through the 
given formula which calculates a single outcome for the uncertain variable.  This process 
is repeated a specified number of times and the results are then tabulated.  The tabulated 
results will imitate the initial input assumption distribution (Mun, 2006). 
Computing technology has become increasingly powerful with the number of 
iterations and the complexities that computers can calculate.  The power in any 
simulation is being able to make better decisions about future uncertainties when real-life 
models would be too complex or expensive to reproduce (Mun, 2006). 
F. EXPERT OPINION 
We asked security experts to assign a weight for the potential damage done for a 
security violation associated with a risk factor or factors.  They were chosen from various 
fields to provide different viewpoints and to flush out areas of concern that may not be 
thought of by polling experts in only one specific area.  The experts have been selected 
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from fields including business, information assurance, physical security and computer 
science.  Due to time constraints we were only able to interview a small number of 
experts.  In order for the model to be useful in a real world situation a much larger 
number of experts in each field would need to be interviewed.  The results would then 
need to be analyzed to create an appropriate set of statistics that could be used.  Further 
discussion on this is included in Chapter VI. 
The experts we interviewed were given a list of the risk categories followed by 
each of the risk factors in that category.  They were asked to weight each of the six main 
risk categories totaling 100 percent with a higher weight representing more potential 
damage.  They were then asked to break down each of the individual risk factors using 
the same method. 
In the future, these weights will be policy driven and will require constant review 
for new threats and vulnerabilities.  There could also be multiple weight sets active varied 
by region or terror threat level. 
G. EXCEL SPREADSHEET EXPLANATION 
An Excel Spreadsheet was used to build a model that represents the security 
measurement function of the RAdAC engine.  The spread sheet has two main parts, the 
first is a Total Security Risk Measurement Sheet and the second is a collection of 
individual risk factor sheets.  The model works by first calculating a most likely value for 
each of the risk factors and then applying a weighting against the values.  The weighted 
values are then summed up to create the Total Security Risk Measurement.  A more 
detailed explanation of the spreadsheet follows. 
1. Total Security Risk Measurement Sheet 
The Total Security Risk Measurement (TSRM) Sheet is shown in Table 2.  The 
risk categories and individual risk factors are listed in Column A.  Column C is the most 
likely value for each transaction.  The most likely value is transferred to the appropriate 
level (High, Medium, or Low) to run through the Monte Carlo simulation on the 
subsequent individual risk factor sheets.  The input for Column E titled “WEIGHT” 




Level calculated from the Monte Carlo simulation.  Column I is the Security Risk 




Table 2.   Total Security Risk Measurement (TSRM) Sheet 
 
 
a. Factor and Category Security Risk Measurement Calculations 
The IA Risk Assessment process as defined by Kenneth Montry (2005) of 
the Boeing Company calculates risk by multiplying the probability of occurrence (Most 
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Likely Value) by the consequence of occurrence (Weight).  The same technique has been 
used in this thesis.  Each of the Factor Security Risk Measurements is calculated by 
multiplying the Expert Weight in column E by the 95% Confidence Level in column G.  
The risk factors under each of the risk categories are then summed to provide the 
Category Security Risk Measurement. Figure 8 is a graphical representation of each of 
the risk categories. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Graphical Representation of Risk Categories 
 
 
(1) The “Most Likely Value” is a numeric value based on 
information compromise statistics.  It is not a one-for-one value based on the number of 
violations taking place.  Rather, the statistic will be classified from 0.00 to 10.00 based 
on a relative floating scale.  The more often an incident takes place and can be attributed 
to a particular risk factor or factors, the higher the most likely value will be for that 
particular factor.  For example, if an information compromise due to a particular risk 
factor happens once out of every 100,000 transactions and is given a “most likely value” 
of 10.00.  If the same event occurs once out of every 500,000 transactions it could also be 
given a “most likely value” 10.00 if the relative scale has changed. 
(2) The “Weight” refers to the potential impact or damage that 
could be caused by an information compromise occurring due to a particular risk factor.   
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A higher number represents more potential damage.  A lower number signifies less 
potential damage.  The weight sets were established by the individual experts polled for 
the thesis. 
b. Total Security Risk Measurement Calculation 
The Total Security Risk Measurement is a sum of the Category Security 
Risk Measurements.  The total returned will be between 0.00% and 100.00%.  Figure 9 
represents the Total Security Risk Measurement which contains the final summation of 
all of the risk categories. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Total Security Risk Measurement 
 
 
2. Individual Risk Factor Sheets 
Following the TSRM sheet are the individual risk factor sheets.  Table 3 shows an 
example.  Each sheet runs the most likely value through the triangle distribution and the 
Monte Carlo simulation for the individual risk factors.  The 95% confidence level is then 
returned to the TSRM sheet.  The risk factor sheets are broken into three sections in order 
from low risk to high risk.  The “Low” risk falls between 0.00 and 3.99.  The “Medium” 
range is between 4.00 and 6.99 and the “High” risk range will 7.00 and 10.00.  The “Most 
Likely Value” will be placed in the appropriate risk range with a simple IF/THEN 
statement.  The two sections not being used will not calculate or return anything to the 
TSRM sheet and will appear invalid. 
In each one of the sections, from Row 4 to Row 7, the upper left table containing 
“Low,” “Likely,” and “High” defines the risk range.  The “Low” and “High” values are 
constant throughout each of the risk factors and represent the minimum and maximum 
conditions defined for the triangular distribution. 
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The “Likely” input corresponds to the matching risk factor “Most Likely Value” 
in the TSRM sheet.  Row 7 defines the cumulative probability.  In Row 11, the mean 
calculates the average of the 5,000 iterations with the standard deviation displayed to the 
right.  The final table represents the 5,000 trials.  Column A defines the trial number.  
Column B chooses a random number through the Excel RAND() function.  Column C 
then uses that random number in the triangular distribution formula (Hesse, 2000). 
 
 
Table 3.   Individual Risk Factor Sheet 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation accounts for uncertainty and provides a forecast or 
confidence level used by the rest of the model.  For example, if the Previous Violations 
factor has been given a most likely value of 2.00 it would be placed in the low risk range.  
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The lowest possible value in that range is 0.00 and the highest is 3.99.  This is shown in 
Row 6 of Table 3.  The Monte Carlo simulation will run through 5,000 iterations of the 
formula with the triangle distribution returning 5,000 numbers between 0.00 and 3.99 
under the “Value” column.  The results are tabulated and placed into standard histogram 
form with bins in increments of 0.5. 
Even though the most likely value is 2.00 based on a combination of historical 
and near real-time data, it cannot be known that it will always be that value.  The Monte 
Carlo simulation will calculate how many times the value will be lower than 2.00 and 
how many times it will be higher than 2.00.  Given the newly calculated distribution it 
can be determined with a confidence level that the risk factor will be below a certain 
number.  In this example the result is 2.00 and is shown in Column E, Row 31 of Table 3. 
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V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will document the results of our evaluation of the TSRM model 
using individual information transactions that will test the accuracy of the model.  Three 
information transaction scenarios have been selected to test the lower, middle and upper 
bounds.  Specifically, each of the scenarios will be tested against each of the expert 
opinion weightings and should return an appropriate TSRM number for the given 
situation. 
This chapter first presents the expert weight sets in an Excel spreadsheet with the 
obtained results and a short explanation.  Following the weight sets, each of the scenarios 
is described in detail and given arbitrary most likely values that correspond to the 
situation to be placed in the model for testing.  Finally, each of the three scenarios was 
applied to the TSRM model against each of the expert weight sets.  The results will be 
presented individually and discussed. 
B. EXPERT WEIGHT SETS 
1. Explanation of the Excel Spreadsheet 
Experts in the fields of Computer Science, Physical Security, Business and 
Information Assurance were asked to give their opinion on a weighting of the identified 
RAdAC risk factors.  Table 4, Columns C through I, represent the four experts weight 
sets from the different fields, while Column K and Column M represent the average of 
the four expert weight sets and an equal weighting respectively.  These final two 
categories provide baseline results from which a few observations will be made. 
The percentages in the risk categories, shown in bold, sum up to 100 percent in 
each column with a higher weighting specified to those categories deemed to have a 
higher potential impact in the event of an information compromise.  The risk factors 
under each risk category equal 100 percent in the same manner.  If the risk factor equals 
zero, the expert did not feel that particular risk factor was relevant.  These will be 
explained later in the individual results. 
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Table 4.   Summary of Expert Weightings 
 
2. Results of Expert Weighting Opinion by Category 
The weightings given by the experts provided quite different results.  Further 
study would be useful to determine if several experts in the same field shared similar 
views.  Additional research in this area could help understand if the differences were 
based on the individual, the field of study or a combination of both.  The results we 
obtained are explained below. 
a. Characteristics of Requester 
The results for this category ranged from 20% to 30%.  The computer 
science expert placed the least emphasis while the information assurance and physical 
security experts both placed the highest weightings. 
b. Characteristics of IT Components 
The results for this category were either 10% or 30%.  The computer 
science expert and information assurance experts placed the least emphasis while the 





The results for this category ranged from 5% to 15%.  The physical 
security and information assurance experts placed the least emphasis while the computer 
science expert placed the highest weighting. 
d. Situational Factors 
The results for this category ranged from 5% to 20%.  Each of the experts 
chose a different weight for this category.  The information assurance expert placed the 
least emphasis while the computer science expert placed the highest weighting. 
e. Environmental Factors 
The results for this category ranged from 10% to 30%.  The physical 
security expert placed the least emphasis while the information assurance expert placed 
the highest weighting. The computer science and business experts both agreed at 15%. 
f. Characteristics of Information Requested 
The results for this category were either 10% or 20%.  The computer 
science expert and information assurance experts placed the most emphasis on this factor 
while the business and physical security experts both placed the lowest weightings. 
3. Results of Expert Weighting Opinion by Field 
a. Computer Science 
This expert placed the least emphasis on the Characteristics of IT 
Components with a weighting of 10%.  The highest emphasis was put on Characteristics 
of Requester, Situational Factors and Characteristics of Information Requested all tied at 
20%.  The Heuristics weighting was set at 15% and Situational Factors at 20%, both of 
which were the highest of all the experts. 
b. Physical Security 
This expert placed the least emphasis on Heuristics with a weighting of 
5%.  The highest emphasis was put on Characteristics of Requester and Characteristics of 
IT Components both tied at 30%.  The Environmental Factors category had a weight of 
10% which was the lowest of all the experts. 
c. Business 
This expert placed the least emphasis on Heuristics, Situational Factors 
and Characteristics of Information Requested all tied with a weighting of 10%.  The 
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highest emphasis was put on Characteristics of IT Components at 30%.  Overall these 
weightings were either tied with or in the middle of the expert’s results. 
d. Information Assurance 
This expert placed the least emphasis on Heuristics and Situational Factors 
both with a weighting of 5%.  The highest emphasis was put on Characteristics of 
Requester and Environmental Factors both at 30%.  The Situational Factors category with 
a weight of 5% was the lowest of all the experts.  The Environmental Factors category 
with a weight of 30% was the highest of all the experts. 
C. LOW RISK SCENARIO, TESTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
1. Low Risk Test Scenario 
A Navy Captain, sitting at his desk in Norfolk, VA, requests a file from another 
command also located in Norfolk.  The Captain has a Top Secret clearance with no 
previous security violations.  The information requested will be used for the normal 
operations of his command.  The information is able to be copied, is non-perishable and 
non-auditable.  The information will only be viewed by the Captain but he has permission 
to write and copy.  The information is unclassified and is located on a DoD SIPRNet 
website that requires PKI Authentication. 
2. Low Risk Most Likely Value Inputs 
These numbers have been chosen arbitrarily throughout the scenario.  They are 
based strictly on what we feel would be an appropriate risk value.  Further research is 
needed to generate accurate inputs for this model.  These numbers represent the most 












3. Low Risk Scenario Test Results 
a. Computer Science Expert 
The Computer Science weighting returned the highest overall TSRM at 
38.85.  In general, the Computer Science expert felt that if the encryption was good 
enough, then machine type, distance, application, connection type and the network were 
irrelevant.  In this scenario the encryption level was good enough to have a low risk value 
so the risk for the Characteristics of IT components was low.  The Characteristics of the 
Information Requested risk category was above both the average and equal weightings 
even though the classification level of the information was unclassified.  This is due to 
the high level of emphasis put on the Classification Level, in this case 90%. 
 
 
Table 6.   Low Risk Scenario Computer Science Expert Results 
 
b. Physical Security Expert 
The Physical Security weightings came in with the second lowest TSRM 
at 32.95.  A low emphasis placed on the Environmental Factors and Characteristics of the 
Information Requested, both 10%, resulted in the risk being lower than the average.  The 
risk associated with Characteristics of IT Components was higher than normal because of 
the 30% weighting assigned to it.  The other categories were in line with the average. 
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Table 7.   Low Risk Scenario Physical Security Expert Results 
 
 
c. Business Expert 
The Business weightings scored the lowest of all the low risk at 31.69. 
The highest weighted risk category, Characteristics of IT Components, was almost a third 
greater than the average score 6.35 vs. 4.24.  The Characteristics of Information 
Requested category was significantly lower than the average because of the 10% 
weighting assigned. 
 





d. Information Assurance Expert 
The Information Assurance weightings came in second highest just above 
the average of 34.94 at 36.21.  Due to the low emphasis on the Situational Factors, 5%, 
the results for this category were well below average.  The Characteristics of Information 
Requested category was driven by the high risk involved with the information being 
perishable as well as the permissions granted.  Even though the operational environment 
presented a medium threat, the emphasis placed on it caused the Environmental Factors 
to be almost double the average. 
 
 




D. MEDIUM RISK SCENARIO, TESTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
1. Medium Risk Test Scenario 
A member of the Joint Chiefs is working on a new campaign plan for an operation 
in Afghanistan.  He is working in a secure facility at the White House and needs Secret 
information located in a secure facility in Virginia.  The Vice Admiral holds a Top 
Secret/SCI clearance with no previous security violations.  He will be using a wired 
connection to his laptop to access information over the SIPRNet.  The Admiral has 
permission to write to the file being requested.  The situation is moderately time sensitive 
and the information being requested is perishable. 
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2. Medium Risk Most Likely Value Input 
These numbers have been chosen arbitrarily throughout the scenario.  They are 
based strictly on what we feel would be an appropriate risk value.  Further research is 
needed to generate accurate inputs for this model.  These numbers represent the most 










3. Medium Risk Test Results 
a. Computer Science Expert 
The Computer Science weighting returned the highest overall TSRM at 
44.81.  The Characteristics of IT Components category was well below average due to 
the emphasis placed on encryption level and the low most likely value for that factor.  
The Characteristics of Information Requested category was well above the average 
because of the high emphasis placed on classification level with a weight of 90%.  With a 
most likely value of seven this factor drove the value significantly above average. 
 
 
Table 11.   Medium Risk Scenario Computer Science Expert Results 
 
 
b. Physical Security Expert 
The Physical Security weightings provided the lowest TSRM at 40.92.  
This was only slightly lower than the Business and Information Assurance results.  The 
Characteristics of IT Components was higher than average because of the value from 
machine type and the overall weighting of 30% put on this category.  The Characteristics 
of Information Requested category was lower than average despite the high risk and 
weight of the network classification because the overall weighting was only 10%.  The 
Heuristics category was well below the average because of the low 5% weighting 
assigned to that category. 
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Table 12.   Medium Risk Scenario Physical Security Expert Results 
 
c. Business Expert 
The Business weighting results provided a TSRM of 40.98.  This score 
was the exact same score of the Information Assurance expert even though the 
distribution was quite different.  The Characteristics of IT Components category was 
relatively high because of the high weighting value of 30%.  This produced a risk much 
higher than the average.  The Characteristics of Information Requested category was 
lower than the average because of the low weighting of 10%.  In the Situational Factors 
category a large emphasis placed on transaction type and audit ability caused high results, 
but these were tempered by the category’s overall low emphasis of 10%. 
 
Table 13.   Medium Risk Scenario Business Expert Results 
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d. Information Assurance Expert 
The Information Assurance weighting results provided a TSRM of 40.98.  
This TSRM resulted in the same measure as the Business expert even though the 
weightings were different.  The Situational Factors category was less than half of the 
average because of a low priority of only 5%.  The Environmental Factors category was 
nearly double the average due to the heavy emphasis of 30% even though the most likely 
values were set at medium risks.  The Characteristics of IT Components was half the 








E. HIGH RISK SCENARIO, TESTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
1. High Risk Test Scenario 
A Marine Corp PFC is conducting house to house searches in Baghdad.  He 
comes across someone who is believed to be a wanted terrorist.  The name is not in his 
local database so he wants to query the CIA’s database located in Virginia.  The Marine 
holds a Secret clearance with no previous security violations and is requesting Top Secret 
information.  The transaction is highly time sensitive and auditable.  The information 
being requested is read-only and non-perishable. 
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2. High Risk Most Likely Value Input 
These numbers have been chosen arbitrarily throughout the scenario.  They are 
based strictly on what we feel would be an appropriate risk value.  Further research is 
needed to generate accurate inputs for this model.  These numbers represent the most 
likely value in the triangle distribution portion of the TSRM model for the high risk 
scenario. 
 
Table 15.   High Risk Scenario Most Likely Values 
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3. High Risk Test Results 
a. Computer Science Expert 
The Computer Science weighting results produced a TSRM of 67.14.  
This result was the second lowest and was below the average of 69.02.  The 
Characteristics of IT Components category was about half the average because of the low 
weighting of 10% assigned.  Heuristics was well above the average because of the 
relatively high emphasis of 15% assigned.  This was the highest weighting of all the 
experts.  The Characteristics of Information Requested category was driven higher than 
the average because of heavy weighting of 90% on the classification level and the high 
most likely value of ten assigned to that factor. 
 
 
Table 16.   High Risk Scenario Computer Science Expert Results 
 
b. Physical Security Expert 
The Physical Security weightings produced the lowest TSRM in the high 
risk category of 64.71.  This result is nearly ten points lower than the high value of 74.46 
obtained by the Information Assurance weightings.  The Characteristics of IT 
Components was higher than the average because of the high weighting of 30%.  The 
Machine type factor produced a value of twice the average because of a most likely value 
of ten and a weighting of 20%.  The Connection type factor was less than half the average 
even though the most likely value was an eight because of a low weighting of 5%.  The 
Characteristics of Information Requested category was well below average because of the 
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low emphasis of 10% assigned.  The Classification level factor weighting of 10% 
produced a risk that was significantly below the average even though the most likely 
value was a ten.  The weighting of 30% assigned to the Network classification level 
produced a result of more than twice average. 
 
 
Table 17.   High Risk Scenario Physical Security Expert Results 
 
 
c. Business Expert 
The Business expert’s results were near average.  A TSRM of 69.84 was 
only 0.82 higher than the average of 69.02.  The Characteristics of IT Components 
category was one third above the average because of a heavy emphasis of 30% and a 
Network risk factor measurement well above the average.  The Characteristics of 
Information Requested was below the average because of the low weighting of 10%. 
Within this category, the Encryption level factor was one and a half times greater than the 
average while the Classification level was nearly half the average. 
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Table 18.   High Risk Scenario Business Expert Results 
 
 
d. Information Assurance Expert 
The Information Assurance weightings provided the highest TSRM of 
74.46.  This result was well above the other results with nearly a ten point gap above the 
lowest TSRM in the High Risk Scenario.  The Characteristics of IT Components category 
was only half the average because of the low weighting of 10%.  The risk factor of 
Connection type was two and a half times the average due to the 30% weighting 
assigned.  The Environmental Factors category was almost twice the average.  With a 
weighting of 30%, the emphasis placed on this category was double that of the next 
closest expert’s weighting.   Within this category, the Operational environment factor was 
much higher than the average because of the 70% weighting assigned.  The 
Characteristics of Information Requested category was about third higher than the 
average because of 20% weighting assigned to the category and also the 30% weighting 
assigned to the permission level. 
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Overall the TSRM model we created measures the risk for the given categories 
appropriately.  The low risk scenario returns a lower value than the value returned for the 
medium and high risk scenarios.  The medium scenario returned a TSRM value higher 
than the low risk scenario and lower than the high risk scenario.  The high risk scenario 
returned values that were higher than both the low and medium risk scenarios. 
 
 
Table 20.   Summary of TSRM Results 
 
Table 20 shows a summary of all the scenario results.  The differences between 
the expert’s weight sets and results were interesting.  The low risk scenario had a range of 
just over seven points with three of the results falling below the equal weightings.  The 
medium risk scenario ended up with three of the results within 6 hundredths of a percent, 
with two being exact, and one nearly four points higher than the rest.  Once again, three 
of the results were below the equal weighting results.  The high risk scenario had an 
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almost ten point spread between the high and low TSRM.  Only two of the results were 
below the equal weighting results and there were at least two points between each of the 
results. 
These kinds of results show the effects that different weightings will have on the 
TSRM and this must be kept in mind when designing the RAdAC engine.  The Computer 
Science expert produced the highest TSRM in both the low and medium risk scenarios 
while the Physical Security expert produced the lowest TSRM in both the medium and 
high risk scenarios.  The Business expert had the lowest TSRM for the low risk scenario 
and the Information Assurance expert had the highest TSRM for the high risk scenario.  
Each of the experts had results that were either at the top or bottom of one of the 
scenarios with none of the results simply in the middle.  This shows that each of the 
experts provided weightings that were significant in each of the scenarios and therefore 
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VI. RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH AND THESIS 
CONCLUSION 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will provide a list of recommended future research topics for both 
the risk portion of the RAdAC engine and RAdAC as a whole.  The discussion includes 
the main issues that were uncovered during research and several software programs that 
may be beneficial in building working models of the RAdAC engine and may be able to 
provide insight into what risk factors are the most important. 
B. RECOMMENDED FURTHER TSRM MODULE RESEARCH 
1. Delphi Method 
We interviewed several experts in a variety of fields to get their opinion on what 
risk factors were important and how they should be weighted.  Due to time constraints, 
the number of experts polled in each field was limited.  Each participant we interviewed 
provided valuable insight into the individual risk factors, the weighting of those factors 
and RAdAC in general.  Given more time, multiple experts in each field should be polled.  
A possible consensus amongst each group of experts could then be reached through the 
Delphi Method and the weight sets would be assigned in this manner (Mun, 2006).  This 
method of assigning weight sets is a more robust and accepted manner on which to assign 
values if no historical data exists. 
2. Risk Factor Analysis 
We attempted to identify risk factors that we felt were most important when 
completing the Total Security Risk Measurement.  However, a number of new issues 
were brought up when discussing our risk factors with experts.  The identification of a 
more comprehensive list of risk factors is an essential next step, including direct and 
correlative risk factors.  Taking that list and then narrowing down to those risks that are 
most important is one of the next steps in completing a working RAdAC engine. 
3. Thesis Assumptions 





We did not account for any false positives for authentication.  We 
assumed the transaction initiator (human or machine) is who he says he is.  This included 
all components of the system used for initiation and transmission of the transaction. 
b. System Failures 
System failures including hardware and software failures were not 
addressed.  We also did not account for the uncertainty associated with human or 
machine error. 
c. Information Assurance 
This thesis did not account for the risk involved with information integrity 
or availability.  We assumed the information was available, accurate and was not 
compromised during transmission. 
4. Actual Data Collection 
The first major issue we encountered while doing this thesis was the lack of 
available data.  An attempt was made to use bank transaction data and credit card 
transaction data to simulate information transaction statistics.  The proprietary nature of 
much of the commercial banking data made it difficult to explore this area.  Likely, any 
study done in this realm would have to be accomplished in the classified arena. 
In order to accurately calculate the risk associated with a particular factor, data is 
needed.  Once real world data is collected, it can be used in various probability 
distributions to calculate a much more accurate risk value. 
Ways to collect, store and analyze data all need to be developed.  One possibility 
we came across is the use of XML data tagging.  A data set could be collected and then 
put into a working RAdAC model to determine actual risk measurements.  Data tags 
could then be used to update a working RAdAC engine in real time. 
5. Relationship of Individual Risk Factors 
One of the major assumptions that we made in our research was the independence 
of the risk factors.  That is to say, that no one risk factor impacted another risk factor.  An 
actual working RAdAC engine would have several factors that are dynamically 
interdependent. 
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One example brought up in the expert opinion survey suggested that if a certain 
type of encryption is used, that the others factors in that category would be irrelevant 
because the encryption would protect the data.  Another example mentioned was the 
comparison between the classification of the data and the clearance of the requester.  If 
the data is classified lower than the clearance, this should change the weighting of these 
factors to lower the risk.  If the data is classified higher than the clearance, this should 
change the weighting to greatly increase the risk.  These types of relationships could 
mean that each transaction could dynamically change the risk factors that are being 
looked at and the weightings that are being applied. 
The issue of risk factor dependency can be addressed by an influence net.  Further 
headway toward a working RAdAC engine can be made by developing a Bayesian based 
model and determining the associations and weighting that each of the risk factors have 
upon one another. 
6. Programs Evaluated 
Throughout this research several software programs were investigated to assist in 
the calculation of risk.  Each of these programs has characteristics that could make them 
useful in creating and validating a model of the RAdAC engine.  These programs are 
briefly described below. 
a. SIAM from SAIC 
A Situational Influence Assessment Model (SIAM) can graphically depict 
factors in a belief net structure and then apply Bayesian probability techniques to assess 
the relationship among factors to determine the overall probability of occurrence.  SIAM 
can also be used to determine critical pressure points, conduct what-if analysis as well as 
identify unintended consequences of specific actions.  The original goal of the thesis was 
to use the SIAM program to model the RAdAC security risk measurement function.  The 
various risk factors could be entered into SIAM as nodes and then different weights and 
link strengths could be applied to see how the top node, in this case the total risk, is 
affected.  Due to time constraints we were unable to put our results into SIAM and build 
a model.  This may still provide some beneficial results especially in identifying the 
relationships between the various factors (http://www.saic.com/products/software/siam/). 
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b. @Risk from Palisade 
@Risk is a Microsoft Excel add-in that uses Monte Carlo simulation to 
show you many possible outcomes.  It allows a user to replace uncertain values in a 
spreadsheet with probability distribution functions.  @Risk can also provide a user with 
Sensitivity and Scenario Analyses to determine the critical factors in a model.  This 
allows the user to rank the distribution functions in the model according to the impact 
they have on the output (http://www.palisade.com/risk/). 
c. PrecisionTree from Palisade 
PrecisionTree is a Decision Analysis add-in for Microsoft Excel.  It is 
used to build decision trees and influence diagrams directly in a spreadsheet.  The user 
can create diagrams easily by selecting cells in the spreadsheet and clicking node buttons 
at the PrecisionTree toolbar.  Once a model is built, PrecisionTree will run a powerful 
decision analysis determining the best way to proceed.  Using PrecisionTree lets the user 
detail all of the possible options and identify the best decision to make.  Another possible 
useful option is PrecisionTree’s Risk Profile feature.  A decision analysis in 
PrecisionTree generates a Risk Profile.  The Risk Profile compares the payoffs and risk 
of different decision options (http://www.palisade.com/precisiontree/). 
d. Real Options from Decisioneering 
Real Options is a Microsoft Excel add-in that uses a systematic approach 
and integrated solution using modeling in applying options theory in a dynamic and 
uncertain environment where decisions are flexible in the context of strategic decision-
making.  The Real Options approach incorporates a learning model, such that 
management makes better and more informed strategic decisions when some levels of 
uncertainty are resolved through the passage of time.  Real Options uses a mix of Monte 
Carlo path-dependent simulation methods, closed-form solutions, partial differential 
equations, and binomial lattice trees (http://www.decisioneering.com/rotoolkit/). 
C. RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH FOR RADAC 
1. Policy for Weighting 
Policies for setting the risk values and weighting will likely come down from 
higher authorities within DoD.  As shown in this thesis through the expert opinions, there 
are great differences in what risk factors various groups deem important.  Getting policy 
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makers in the DoD to agree on which factors are important and how they should be 
weighted will be a difficult obstacle to the implementation of RAdAC.  A process such as 
the Delphi Method, discussed above, could be useful with this problem also. 
2. Units of Measure 
The risk factors identified in this thesis vary from the characteristics of people, to 
IT equipment, to threat levels.  These factors are not of equal magnitude or measure.  It is 
unrealistic to weigh the risk of someone’s rank against the risk of a network device on the 
same linear scale.  Research is needed to develop various scales of measure that can adapt 
the different types of risk factors. 
3. The Remainder of the RAdAC Engine 
This thesis only addressed the security measurement of the RAdAC engine.  
There is still research needed on how to quantify the operational need and then how to 
make a final access decision.  The three main functions of the RAdAC engine must be 
able to operate both independent of each other and as one unit.  Developing models for 
each of the functions and then incorporating them into a single working model will 
provide a great step forward for the realization of RAdAC. 
4. A Feedback Mechanism 
In order for the RAdAC engine to dynamically adjust and for commanders to 
apply policies that maximize information flow, there needs to be a feedback loop.  The 
feedback loop should capture how successful the information transaction was and how 
the information was used to improve a mission.  The feedback loop also needs to be able 
to capture how a denied request affected a mission.  Learning how the RAdAC decisions 
affect mission outcomes will provide a large step forward for the RAdAC engine.  
Another important piece of the feedback loop is related to the Trust Level risk factor.  
Research needs to be conducted on how best to capture both successful and unsuccessful 
transactions in a way that the results can be used to build trust within the system. 
D. THESIS CONCLUSION 
In summary, this thesis provided the requirements for RAdAC as part of the 
Global Information Grid and the NetOps construct.  A brief overview was given on 
currently existing access control methods.  Following the existing access control 
methods, the RAdAC concept was explained in detail. 
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Our research first yielded a list of possible RAdAC risk factors.  These factors 
were grouped in the NSA identified risk categories; Characteristics of Requester, 
Characteristics of IT Components, Heuristics, Situational Factors, Environmental Factors 
and Characteristics of Information Requested.  While the identified factors are not 
intended to be a complete list, it will provide a preliminary list of possible factors to be 
incorporated into a working RAdAC engine. 
The next step in our thesis was to identify a process to quantify the risk associated 
with each factor.  Without existing statistical data on the risk factors we decided to use a 
triangle distribution to simulate real world data.  An Excel model was used to calculate a 
most likely value that accounts for uncertainty through Monte Carlo simulation.  We 
assigned an initial arbitrary most likely value to each of the risk factors and ran the value 
through 5,000 iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation.  The simulation returned a final 
most likely value with a 95% confidence level. 
Following the identification of risk factors and the process of calculating values 
with uncertainty, a weighting scheme was needed in order to calculate the total risk.  We 
interviewed experts in the fields of Business, Physical Security, Information Assurance 
and Computer Science.  They provided us with their opinion on how the risk factors 
should be weighted.  We formed an aggregate list, analyzed each of their results and 
compared and contrasted the results to the equal weight and average weighting baselines. 
The final step of the thesis was to calculate the Total Security Risk Measurement.  
The calculated most likely value was multiplied by the expert weightings and the results 
were summed to provide the total risk.  The model was tested for accuracy using several 
boundary case scenarios and the results were presented and explained. 
Whether or not RAdAC as it is known today is successful, the process outlined in 
this thesis to calculate the TSRM can be utilized as the next generation of risk adaptable 
access control is formulated.  As risk factors are identified and formalized in policy, 
statistics can be gathered to provide a useful near real time database which to run the 
RAdAC engine.  Calculating the operational need, the final access decision and 
determining and managing the digital policies are just a few of the big pieces of the 
puzzle needed to get a working RAdAC engine.  While an enormous amount of work still 
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exists for RAdAC to come to fruition, this thesis provides some of the groundwork 
required to change from the need-to-know paradigm that exists today to the need-to-share 
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